

**ARMY review
completed***

Comment 1 10/1/70

27 April 1970

Major General Kenneth G. Wickham
The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20315

AGAR-S (9521)/3

Dear General Wickham:

In response to your request dated 13 March 1970 (Reference AGAR-S (9521)/3) the attached documents were reviewed. This Agency concurs in the declassification and has no objections to the release of these documents to Mr. Mark Stoler, an unofficial researcher.

Sincerely,



CIA Records Administration Officer

STATINTL

Attachments:
3 pages of notes
Nos. 211, 225,
and 226

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 Addressee
1 OSS File
1 RAB File

DDS/SSS/RAB  (27 Apr 70)

STATINTL

22 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1A

SUBJECT : Request from The Adjutant General's
Office for Declassification of OSS
Documents

REFERENCE : AGAR-S (9521)/3

1. Returned herewith are the documents from the Department of the Army which they have requested to be reviewed to determine if they can now be declassified.

2. The Office of Security and the CI Staff have no objections to the declassification of subject documents. Accordingly, the Strategic Services Unit authorizes you to advise the Department of the Army that the documents may be declassified and used for the purposes specified in their memorandum.

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary,
SSU

25X1A

Attachments:
As stated above

18 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Services Unit
SUBJECT : Declassification of Mark Stoler Notes

The Adjutant General's Office proposes to declassify the attached notes made by Mr. Mark Stoler from OSS originated documents if there are no objections from this Agency. May I have your concurrence or comments.



Chief, Support Services Staff

STATINTL

Attachments:

1. Trans fr TAGO
2. Notes #9521/3;
pages 211, 225, 226.

17 MAR 1970



Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030006-7

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

AGAR-S (9521)/3

10 MAR 1970

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Records Administration Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Mr. Mark Stoler, an unofficial researcher in Army files, has taken a number of classified notes in his study of "Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Foreign Policy in Europe, 1941-1945." Among them were two notes of 3 pages, from OSS-originated documents. Copies of these are attached.

The Department of State and this Department have no objections to the declassification of these notes. If there are no objections within your agency, this office will declassify the attached 3 pages and return them to Mr. Stoler.

Your comment is requested.

Sincerely,

Cyrus H. Fraker

for JACK L. GUTHRIE
Acting Chief, Office Management Division

Inclosures
3 pages of notes
Numbers 211, 225
and 226, classified
SECRET

RECEIVED
WHEN SEPARABLE FROM

Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030006-7

STATE

211

JFO

SECRET

Security Classification secret

0321/3

Notes taken from the Records of: OPD

Type of Document: Memorandum

File No. and Symbol: Exec. 1 Item 26a

From: OSS to Roosevelt

Subject: Intelligence Reports--"Roston Series"

Date: 1/10/44

To: Marshall

In intelligence reports re: Germany is something on Russia:

November 3, 1943--Prior to Moscow Conference, Stalin told French General Gouraud (might be

Roger Garreau, Delegate at Moscow of French Committee of Liberation) Soviet war aims:

1. To absorb the Baltic Countries into Soviet Russia.
2. The western border of Poland is to be the Oder River and its eastern border is to be that of 1941.
3. The Rhineland is to be independent.
4. Bessarabia and Bukovina are to become Soviet republics.
5. Under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, there is to be a Balkan Entente.
6. Apparently, there is desired an entente with England
7. Austria is to be independent
8. There is to be free passage through the Straits of Dardanelles. However, there are no demands for territory against Turkey.
9. There are no claims on East Asia."

Author Office Comment:

State

225

secret.

Memorandum

381 (9-2-41) Sec. VII P.G.40/1

8/6/43

MOSS Planning Group

JCS

"Manifesto to German People by Moscow National Committee of Free Germany"

Purpose of paper is to advise JCS of psychological and political implications of the manifesto.

"The manifesto seems to reflect confidence in Russia's military and political strength in the present situation and her determination to provoke at least a limited revolution in Germany before any peace negotiations. It could serve equally well as cover for a separate peace between the Soviet and a militarist regime in Germany or for a far-reaching program of eventual invasion and Bolshevization." But this unilateral move does not necessarily mean that Russia is determined to pursue a "lone wolf" policy towards Germany. Whatever Russian intentions, Manifesto may have far-reaching implications from many points of view--psychological warfare implications. Also, it would put Russia at a great advantage over U.S. and Britain in negotiations with Germans. As for political implications,

"The political implications of this manifesto are not only far-reaching from the Soviet viewpoint but disturbing from the ideological and political viewpoint of the United States and Great Britain."--Manifesto, while aimed at overthrow of Hitler government, also contemplates a government favorable to Moscow. "This might result in a communistic Germany, which would scarcely be acceptable to the United States and Great Britain." Also, success in Manifesto might lead to breakdown of German resistance--this would put Russia in a position, "with forces on the field" to arrange peace and German government "to its liking." Also, the manifesto represents "a major political move."--probably timed to coincide with eastern victories and increased air activity in west--Germany may now be seeking peace--winter coming, Italy knocked out. All we offer Germans is unconditional surrender--no assurances against vengeance by occupied peoples.

"Complete political unity does not exist between the Soviet Union and the other United Nations, and political differences arising out of the manifesto may lead to a dangerous situation between these countries. The possible dangers to our military and political strategy are such that a re-examination of our American political position as it relates to the manifesto is indicated." But, at the same time, Germany can use this opportunity to exploit political disunity among allies--avoid premature or hasty steps that would wreck or postpone our basic objective--total defeat of Germany.

Conclusions:

- 1) Manifesto may have great psychological value in overthrowing Hitler--good.
- 2) "Present Soviet policy towards post-war political development in Germany as reflected in the manifesto is dangerous in its implications in that it might result in a government opposed to the political and idealistic principles for which we are fighting. Our political position will be greatly enhanced as our military forces arrive on the continent of Europe."
- 3) We should continue to use all psychological warfare and military pressures toward overthrow of Hitler and total defeat of Germany.
- 4) If a joint Anglo-American-Soviet policy is not established, "we must be prepared at the psychological time to present to Germany conditions which will offset the Russian proposals in the armistice and the peace."

Copy of manifesto follows, with appendices. Appendix B links the manifesto with press reports on it and other events--part IV links it to Soviet intervention against eastern federations--"reveals determined hostility to any grouping of the smaller states of central

(B)

secret

ABC (continued)

381 (9-25-41) Sec. VII
OSS Planning Group

JCS

of southeastern Europe." These are all negative aspects of Soviet policy, and Soviet policy also has positive aspects (negative aspects are "apprehension of the objectives of an Anglo-American peace and of the machinations of the governments in exile.") The paper then lists certain Soviet moves--the Hungarian Front for National Independence, set up under Soviet auspices, consolidation of position in northern Iran, the Polish Union in Moscow and the Polish Legion, the approaches to the British on a treaty with Czechoslovakia, Soviet interest in Chinese Communists, support of Tito, "vigorous revival" of Pan-Slavism, and the Free Germany Committee.

"These examples of Soviet activities indicate that the 'dissolution' of the Comintern was, in fact, a clearing of the decks for intensifying nationalistic policy." The Polish Patriots and the Free German Committee are built around old Polish and German sections of the Comintern.

The basic question is, which of the following policies (or which 2, or three more) is being pursued: reduce enemy's will to resist; combat suspected machinations for an "Anglo-American-Vatican" peace at Soviet expense; world revolution; traditional Russian imperialism. The Committee fits into a pattern of Soviet moves leading up to this that began with Stalin's speech of November 7, 1942--Committee was the result of long and careful planning--set up by the Kremlin. 1939 pact and Baltic moves hint to policy number 4--imperialism.

"Examination of the manifesto and of the circumstances attending it underlies the fact that complete political unity does not exist between the Soviet Union and the other United Nations. Indeed, Soviet mistrust of Great Britain and the United States remains openly manifest. The Soviet Union has been waging a singularly independent war. In anticipation of collapse, Germany may become susceptible to Soviet manipulation. In such an event, the U.S. and Great Britain might find themselves unable to effectively intervene politically either in Germany, the Middle Zone (between Germany and Russia), or in southeastern Europe."